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Abstract: 
This case study explores the origins of Nokia’s decline in the mobile 
technology market, as an unsuccessful attempt to introduce an open 
source strategy into the business. Nokia created a hybrid model, which 
codified conflicting principles taken from closed and open mode of 
collaboration. A series of implementation problems resulted in Nokia 
struggling to attract open source partners, growing issues with managing 
in-house staff and ultimately failing to develop a new mobile operating 
system fast enough to stay competitive.  
Key learning outcomes: At the competition of the case study students will:  
• understand complexity of open innovation implementation when 
paradigmatic differences between businesses and/or partners are not 
resolved;  
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/iei
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• be able to critically evaluate a hybrid knowledge innovation model and 
how it might create difficulties at the operational level  
• identify challenges of management in relation to open source software 
developers,  
• analyse strategies which corporations may employ to successfully benefit 
from the open source software (and similar) movement and how 
organizational hypocrisy can lead to failure of open innovation projects.  
Intended use: This case study is best suited for post-graduate or executive 
courses. 
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 1 
 
NOKIA ON THE SLOPE: THE FAILURE OF A HYBRID OPEN/CLOSED SOURCE 
MODEL 
 
 
 
Background 
 
Open innovation has become a new paradigm for understanding industrial progress. It 
works on the premise that widely distributed knowledge leads to innovation, which occurs 
at the interspaces between a diverse range of groups and organizations (Swan & 
Scarbrough, 2005). Primarily to advance their technology and systems, businesses need 
to make use of both internal and external ideas (Chesbrough, 2003). Open innovation 
models enable customers and users to contribute their knowledge to a company’s R&D 
processes. Many companies now understand the benefits of this and have incorporated 
such models to strengthen their creativity and profits (Weber, 2004). Open source software 
(OSS) is the common field in which open innovation takes place. However, we must 
remember that open source software is a community-based model of development, not a 
business model per se, and its existence precedes the concept of open innovation. 
Extant studies suggest that the open innovation models offer many opportunities, although 
it also bear risks. Although it can be argued that open innovation is inevitable, it remains a 
challenge for business organizations seeking to benefit from external knowledge sources 
but still operating like closed systems. The change in the business model requires not only 
adapted structures and systems, but also redefining of a company’s role in those 
structures and systems (Ciesielska, 2010). The open paradigm also challenges the 
traditional proprietary business approach because it is ruled by a different intellectual 
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 2 
property regimes and populated by variety of participants with different ideologies. But 
above all, a fully open R&D process makes a company more vulnerable to its competitors. 
It also risks that their competitive advantage may be easier to copy. However, somewhat 
ironically, the whole body of open innovation research offers little in-depth analysis of the 
organizational and legitimacy problems involved in creating a hybrid open 
source/corporate structure. Ruuska et al. (2009) argue that any knowledge integration 
requires crossing not only temporal, spatial, and task boundaries but also authority, social 
and identity boundaries. The former ones may be less visible and harder to overcome. 
Generation of knowledge is a collective activity and as such requires substantial levels of 
coordination between heterogeneous agents and common coherent institutional 
background in order to succeed (Antonelli, 2006): ‘Knowledge does not spill freely and 
automatically in the atmosphere: dedicated efforts are necessary to create the institutional 
context into which external knowledge can be acquired and to reduce its uncontrolled 
leakage.’ (Antonelli 2006: 234) Literature identify employees, R&D personnel (Schroll and 
Mild, 2011), non-R&D personnel (Robertson et al., 2012) and managers (Jones, 2006) as 
important gatekeeper for absorbing new knowledge. Laviolette et al. (2016) report that 
both non-research and development personnel can play a crucial role in inbound open 
innovation. 
In their seminal work, Meyer and Rowan (1977) noted that individuals in organizations 
tend to get involved in symbolic actions that aim to decouple from formal structures. 
Decoupling means that organizations tend to adopt various formal solutions in response to 
a range of institutional pressures, but do not necessarily enact those structures. When 
organizations have to deal with incommensurable institutional or stakeholders’ pressures, 
they often start to couple their activities, talks, and decisions in odd manners (Brunsson, 
2003). The concept of organizational hypocrisy explains how organizations struggling for 
legitimacy and satisfying interests of different parties talk and decide about important 
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 3 
issues, showing their involvement in one direction while in practice acting in the opposite 
direction. This implies that, if a company makes many statements and reveals future plans, 
actual executions may be far away (or even opposite) from those declarations. However, 
the organizational hypocrisy strategy only works if people assume that talks are leading to 
coherent actions and it is not revealed that the organization is decoupling its talks from 
activities (Brunsson, 2003). Swan and Scarbrough (2005), in their study on the politics of 
networked innovation, highlight that the power of the system may constitute barriers to 
innovation and make knowledge integration efforts less effective. Enberg et al. (2006) 
argue that little effort has been devoted to developing alternatives to rationalistic project 
management concepts of how and with what mechanisms knowledge integration 
processes are utilized in the context of uncertainty and political pressures.  
 
 
The case 
In 2013 Nokia sold their mobile branch to Microsoft for $7.17 billion. After several years of 
outstanding success and rising profits, the company had already failed in its transition to 
smart phones and a customer-focused business model (Doz & Kosonen, 2008). But the 
problems started in the early 2000s when the company seemed to lose its strategic 
sensitivity. This is possibly due to a great success during the 1990’s, which made its 
leaders underestimate rising competitive threats and a new phase of technological 
progress in the mobile industry (Ciesielska, 2010).  Although it is true that Nokia did not 
stop working on incremental changes to its operating system, Symbian, its major 
investment and hopes were put into the open source Maemo project. As accurately noted 
by the open innovation expert Henry Chesbrough, Nokia's approach to innovation should 
have embraced radical changes. ‘This company that achieved so much with its product 
design in the 1990s must develop an entirely new set of innovation skills in order to create, 
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 4 
develop, and manage a platform— an ecosystem of other companies that build their 
offerings on top of Nokia's.’ (Chesbrough, 2011:5), but this has not fulfilled. Instead this 
case shows that interaction between organizations that share an open environment often 
results in emerging paradoxes (Munoz & Lu, 2011). 
 
From Symbian to Maemo 
During the ten years leading up to the Microsoft takeover in 2013, Nokia’s Internet 
tablet/smart phone product announcements and releases were entangled with 
organizational changes in the company (See Fig 1). Nokia started to work on a multi-
media device quite early. The development process was initiated in 2002 with the Nokia 
7700, which was based on Symbian. Symbian was an old proprietary operating system 
which Nokia had used for years. However, it soon became obvious that the current 
platform had its limitations and would potentially be unsuitable as an operating system for 
new types of embedded mobile devices, such as smart phones. New, innovative solutions 
were clearly needed, but Nokia didn’t seem to have any ideas, or a business partner that 
could provide an answer. 
At that time, there was a very small number of Nokia engineers who had links to the OSS 
world and this was enough to start a quasi-hobbyist project to develop a Linux-based 
mobile operating system. Linux is an example of free open source software and, since its 
development in 1991, it has become the main operating system for the world’s super 
computers. Initially, Nokia’s management did not take the idea seriously. In fact, this 
attitude continued until the engineering team came up with the first actual product 
prototype: Tablet N770.  
Tablet N770 offered an Opera internet browser, internet radio access and a media player. 
The device and its operating system, Maemo, were officially announced in 2005 at the 
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 5 
Linux World Fair and Conference in New York City. It was at this point that Nokia’s 
management declared that the Maemo project was an initial step in creating an open 
source product for broadband and internet services; they also stated that the company 
would now be coordinating and regularly launching new versions of the software.  
At this stage all Nokia had was an internet-enabled prototype device, but this gave hope 
for maintaining their competitive position in the future. With the right investment and 
attitude, Nokia had a chance to create a device which incorporated new and exciting smart 
phone technology. However, Nokia’s development process was relatively slow and other 
big players in the market (primarily Google and Apple) had already been working 
intensively on the idea of smart phones packed with internet browsing and multimedia 
utilities. 
The second generation of tablet, N800, was rolled out in January 2007. In October that 
same year, the third-generation, N810. The operating system was upgraded to Maemo 3, 
then to version 4; the devices were additionally equipped with an integrated camera and a 
Skype/VoIP application. Unlike previous tablets, the N810 release had a side-slider with a 
full QWERTY-keyboard, together with a touch screen, a Mozilla internet browser, 
GoogleTalk and GPS navigation.  
However, until 2009 and the N900 model, the internet tablet was a product without a SIM 
card designed for internet browsing via a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN). The N900 
was the first embedded system that successfully combined the mobility and size of a 
cellular phone and, to a certain extent, the usability of a laptop. Unlike a regular phone, it 
was programmable according to the user’s needs and they could develop, upgrade and 
install software as desired. In 2009, Nokia was working on the Maemo 5 system, which 
also incorporated Qt libraries.  
The following section describes Nokia’ hybrid model, taking into account key 
organizational principles related to intellectual property rights, knowledge distribution, 
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 6 
membership, incentives, authority and coordination of the project, and the dominant mode 
of communication. 
 
Nokia’s Hybrid Model 
Nokia became involved with open source software in two distinct ways. Firstly, it 
contributed to well-established projects, such as the Linux kernel or GNOME. GNOME is a 
desktop environment for GNU/Linux and UNIX-type operating systems and it is used for 
managing applications. The code from these established projects became the basis for 
creating an operation system on Nokia’s internet tablets. The second way Nokia got 
involved in OSS was by starting its own open source community. The Maemo.org website, 
and its community, was aimed at producing free applications for Nokia devices. The code 
from Maemo.org was supposed to be free of charge (both for Nokia and its customers) via 
an application store.  
However, not all components of the new software were open sourced. Some of it came 
from commercial vendors, or was developed internally by the company and released as a 
closed module. The mixed structure in which Nokia hoped to bring innovation was an open 
source/business hybrid. This hybrid was constructed around a mixture of organizing 
principles which merged the open source and commercial mode of software development.  
 
Knowledge Integration and Distribution 
The operating system for internet tablets, Maemo (later MeeGo), was composed primarily 
of free and open source software. Nokia’s vision (or perhaps propagated visualization) of 
Maemo was its centrality, in the sense that it took bits and pieces from different OSS 
projects and compiled them into the operating system via the cooperation of the Nokia and 
Maemo communities (Maemo.org website). Approximately 25 percent of the packages on 
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 7 
the Maemo platform were taken directly from open source software upstream projects; 50 
percent of the packages originated in OS upstream projects, but were modified internally 
by Nokia; the remaining 25 percent of the packages constituted proprietary components 
(Jaaksi, 2007).  Thus, approximately 75 percent of the operating system for Nokia tablets 
had external inputs. Nokia was involved in those projects at various levels of engagement. 
This participation in the upstream OSS projects enabled the access and transfer of 
necessary knowledge to develop Maemo OS. A volatile balance seemed to exist between 
different interests regarding knowledge sharing. On the one hand, Nokia started to 
understand the advantages of following and directly contributing to upstream processes. 
Initially, they tried to fork the projects and develop them internally, but they then had to 
subcontract companies to post factum reintegrate the code. The critical point in this 
process was the translation of open source logics on the corporate grounds, and 
explaining to the mangers where the gains came from. According to Ari Jaaksi, Nokia’s 
vice president, its work with Maemo taught Nokia to avoid ‘forking’ the code. To benefit 
fully from open source processes, a company should make an effort not to deviate 
significantly from its upstream components; if they are working on their own version of the 
source code repository, too many differences make it difficult to incorporate software 
upgrades.  
 
Intellectual Property  
Nokia was a corporation that, for many years, focused on the closed R&D model. Not long 
before it started integrating OSS, its research centre explicitly stated that its mission was 
to produce more patents. After Nokia became involved in OSS development in 2008, it had 
to officially reformulate its strategy and (at least within OSS operations) switch goals from 
increasing the number of useful patents to expanding its collaborative networks. 
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 8 
At the same time, Nokia stated on wiki.maemo.org that the OSS licensing model is 
preferred by the company. But despite this, Nokia went on to execute a highly confusing 
approach, both internally and externally. It applied a ‘novelty rule’ for its engineers, one 
which stated that any code potentially constituting a ‘competitive advantage’ should not be 
open sourced unless agreed with the management. In fact, this attempt at a competitive 
advantage differentiation is perhaps the most important factor in this whole argument: The 
nature of most open source licensing makes it impossible to patent any top-up solutions. If 
the ‘novelty’ rule were taken to extremes, many crucial upgrades might not have been 
returned to the upstream projects, which is against community spirit. It seems that the 
differentiation between clear and novelty was not only uncertain to begin with, but that the 
definition was also at the discretion of various levels of management within the company, 
which further confused an already unstable hybrid business model. The reality of Nokia’s 
activities not only contradicted some of its strategy presentations, but they were also 
incoherent in themselves. This did not go unnoticed. On many occasions during 
conferences, meetings, blog posts and private conversations, OSS developers unofficially 
complained about Nokia creating double standards.  
 
Membership  
Typical open source software projects are voluntary and gather together independent 
developers, corporate employees, open source firm programmers, translators and users. 
The main issue facing Nokia’s Maemo-related network was not how to restrict 
membership, as it is in more commercially-oriented project, but rather the difficulty in 
engaging capable participants who were interested in developing projects for Nokia 
(preferably for free).  
Nokia became involved in the open source movement by employing developers through a 
number of arrangements, including: Work contracts; subcontracting; supporting companies 
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 9 
via task-oriented contracts; and sponsoring talented individuals in non-contractual, ‘favour-
for-a-favour’ relationships. Most developers involved in open source operations at Nokia 
were previously engaged in major OSS projects. From the company side, it seemed to be 
a conscious strategy to recruit people with proven expertise, in order to acquire necessary 
knowledge and skills; as well as advancing Nokia’s reputation and position in OSS 
communities.  
However, the recruitment process wasn’t easy and on several occasions the brightest 
people within OSS weren’t willing to enter into any formal agreements with Nokia. 
Consequently, the corp ration needed to try and interest a developer in a particular bug or 
problem and hope that he or she would work out a solution. So by employing, 
subcontracting, or sponsoring people in this way to do the open source-related jobs, Nokia 
pushed its own projects forward and enabled developers to make a living from their hobby-
projects. However, many open source developers didn’t want to pursue long-term career 
plans with Nokia and sustaining loyalty became a major issue. 
 
Coordination  
Authority and control in the open source world is a difficult thing to maintain. Nokia tried to 
keep an influence over many OSS organizations, usually by sponsoring and participating 
in foundation boards. This ensured that the corporation kept a voice in what was 
developed and influenced its development further, at least formally. However, the 
decisions made by core developers were, to a large extent, entirely independent. Because 
of this the upstream OSS project stayed beyond Nokia’s direct control.  
Nokia, as all other participants in this process, could download updates and submit code to 
the main repository (subject to acceptance from the core development group). Thus, on 
upstream open source grounds, Nokia had full power over its own actions and its own 
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 10 
submissions. However, it could never have been sure which alignments would be made 
between its own code and the upstream one. This seemed to be a serious concern for top 
management and, in this context, Nokia’s decision to buy Qt library was clearly an effort to 
gain full control over one of the projects and its submissions. 
At the same time Maemo’s highly-controlled environment actively discouraged many 
talented developers. As well as this, Nokia also learnt that attracting such developers, and 
gaining their full commitment, didn’t just require their trust in Nokia’s ability to run the 
project effectively. Working with them primarily required trust in the company’s declaration 
to support the open source movement. The company’s indecisiveness about their sharing 
policy, and their difficulty in recruiting permanent staff and relocating them to Finland, 
resulted in a high staff turnover and lowered commitment. HRM became even more 
challenging as a result. 
 
Communication  
Despite Nokia’s declared openness, OSS developers faced problems with communication 
which came into direct conflict with open source principles. For instance, the corporation’s 
internet security policy created some burden on OSS development. Since open source 
work is done primarily online and, as a result, dual solutions were implemented. For 
instance, there was a separate, unofficial infrastructure available for the OSS contributors, 
while the rest of the employees were using the standard, well-protected network.  
As well as internet access, Nokia was also extremely careful about what was allowed to be 
publicly said about its plans and R&D activities. Officially, almost no decisions were made 
public until the last moment, just before the release of a product or a piece of software. In 
practice, a lot of plans and activities became secret de Polichinelle, as they were already 
distributed among trusted informal networks and never released to the rest of the 
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 11 
company. On many occasions, Nokia’s open source system developers admitted revealing 
more details of their internal work than what was formally permitted. This happened in 
various ways, such as by hinting at external collaborators or allowing outsiders to Nokia to 
test unreleased pieces of software. And although such behaviour went against corporate 
policy, there was not a single case when a developer was sanctioned for it. Middle 
management usually understood that this is how open source collaboration worked and so 
another inconsistency became common practice. 
 
 
TEACHING NOTE 
1. Case synopsis 
This paper presents Nokia’s journey from closed to open knowledge integration model. It 
shows that initially easy start with involvement in open source communities and being able 
to make use of open source software is not enough to succeed with open innovation. 
Several key management issues which contributed to Nokia’s failure are highlighted: an 
inability to engage external contributors and gain trust in open source software 
communities, the implementation of an unclear, hybrid business model with open 
collaboration being used within the company’s core competitive advantage area, and 
HRM-related problems related to managing open source style of work. 
2. Learning outcomes 
At the competition of the case study students will: 
• understand complexity of open innovation implementation when paradigmatic 
differences between businesses and/or partners are not resolved; 
• be able to critically evaluate a hybrid knowledge innovation model and how it might 
create difficulties at the operational level  
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 12 
• identify challenges of management in relation to open source software developers,  
• analyse strategies which corporations may employ to successfully benefit from the 
open source software (and similar) movement and how organizational hypocrisy 
can lead to failure of open innovation projects. 
3. Discussion questions & analysis 
a. What are the potential benefits and risks with implementation of open 
innovation paradigm? 
Extant studies suggest that the open innovation model offers many opportunities for 
businesses. By introducing more diversity, linking variety of people and companies, it 
encourages organizational change and ‘the loose coupling between the innovation process 
of the firm and its business model invites close examination of this coupling’ (Chesbrough, 
2006a:33).  
However, the open innovation model also bears many risks. A fully open R&D process 
makes a company more vulnerable to its rivals by making their competitive advantage 
easier to copy. Although the strategic perspective argues that open innovation is 
inevitable, it remains a challenge for business organizations seeking to benefit from 
external knowledge sources but still operating like closed systems. The change in the 
business model requires not only adapted structures and systems, but also the redefining 
of a company’s role in those structures and systems (Ciesielska & Westenholz, 2016).  
b. Why did new Nokia knowledge integration model become problematic 
over time? 
It is clear that Nokia needed a better balance between closed and open knowledge 
integration models. Totally unrestricted knowledge sharing would have made all R&D 
processes available to direct competitors. On the other hand, Nokia learnt that sharing-
only OSS collaboration is beneficial for a business. Nokia was taking the source code from 
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 13 
the OSS projects and changing two thirds of it in-house, for use on the internet tablet. This 
seemed not to be cost or time effective. Although Nokia claimed that it was making efforts 
to ensure that the modifications were accepted into the main projects, insider’s 
perspectives reveal that the internal policy was driven by the competitive advantage rule. 
Such a policy resulted in submitting only minor repairs of bugs to open source projects and 
thus contradicted the rules of the open source system (Ciesielska & Westenholz, 2016).   
The Nokia case accumulated problems related to knowledge integration from both closed 
and open innovation models (Ulhøi, 2004). This happened because Nokia had to deal with 
internal functional divisi ns, while an external OSS community promoted an ethic that was 
ideologically contradictory and hard to control. Technical details and other types of 
knowledge translations were judged by their commercial value and kept in secret. But from 
the OSS perspective knowledge sharing is a basis for collaboration. Nokia hybrid model 
and its problems are summarised in table 1. 
 
c. How did Nokia’s management deal with employment and motivation of 
Open Source Software developers? 
From the internal knowledge integration perspective, developers often complained about 
constant re-organization.  At one point, they had to adjust to new structures and processes 
every several months. Since open source operations tasks were connected only to 
software development, they had to cooperate with the hardware designers. Not only does 
this type of knowledge divide both departments, but the company was also divided 
ideologically. The case shows that not enough effort was put into proper integration and 
co-ordination, both at ideological and practical level. 
Other problematic issues included strategic management decisions and their practical 
consequences. Some employees believed that strategic decisions were sometimes taken 
without real consideration for technical issues and at meetings developers were rarely 
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listened to. Eventually Nokia’s managers found that developing a hybrid structure closely 
linked to, and dependent on, an exterior collaboration network, required them to manage 
the coexistence of conflicting values. However, that knowledge came to them too late, as 
they constantly failed to maintain and span boundaries between public and private, open 
and closed and contractual worker versus professional developer (Ciesielska, 2010). Other 
research also shows the in the absence of scripts for how to deal with the tensions 
between logics, there is ambiguity around choice of goals, target population, or 
management principles (Battilana & Dorado, 2010).   
d. Can you identify key strategies that could have prevented Nokia from 
failing? 
i. Building Long-term Relationships with OSS Communities 
Because open innovation is dependent on external partners and contributors, the company 
must spend time and effort engaging with selected open source software communities. 
Those communities usually differ in their logic and governance from business 
organisations (Jemielaniak, 2014), which may encourage organisational hypocrisy rather 
that actual strategic and operational change.  Building trust and being honest about a 
company’s involvement and ensuring the company brings value to the greater project, are 
essential to facilitate collaboration. It is important to have a coherent strategy of how the 
company will get involved and sustain their contributions to the open source project, 
without risking a loss of business or being considered as a community customer 
(Ciesielska & Iskoujina, 2012; Ciesielska & Petersen, 2013).  
ii. Rethinking Competitive Advantage  
Implementation of a hybrid business model that introduces open innovation into the 
company offers many new R&D opportunities. However, deep involvement in an open 
source project requires both inbound and outbound open innovation. This means that the 
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company cannot only be a community customer, but is expected to effectively contribute to 
the project. Working in the open makes the company vulnerable to its competitors. 
Therefore, it is crucial that the company rethinks their competitive advantage and makes 
sure the open collaboration doesn’t threaten their market position (Chesbrough, 2006b). 
iii. Tackling Internal difficulties of Implementation  
All strategic change will cause implementation problems and switching from a closed 
innovation model to a hybrid one is not an exception. In this case, the particular difficulty 
comes from the need to mix conflicting ideas about how internal organization and HRM 
should work. The case shows that the hybrid organization concept may seem easy to 
implement in theory, but in practice there are a range of ideological and commitment 
problems to proposed solutions. By tackling them early enough, a company can prevent 
turf wars and workforce distress, thus saving money and potentially saving the business 
entirely. More about hybrid originations and responses to contradictions within them can 
be found in Battilana & Dorado (2010), Jay (2013) and Battilana & Lee (2014). 
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Figure 1: Nokia’s internet tablet development line; source: the author, developed 
from Ciesielska, 2010:38.  
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Table 1: Nokia hybrid model of innovation and its problems 
Organizing 
principles 
Nokia’s business–OS hybrid 
Problems with implementation: 
Enacting conflicting 
organizational principles 
Knowledge 
integration 
and 
distribution 
1. 3 sources of code: OSS, 
subcontractors, and Nokia 
internally. Some software 
components are closed 
(proprietary) while others 
use OSS licensing. Main 
burdens for knowledge 
creation:  
2. Boundary objects: the code 
repository, documentation, 
financial documentation, 
business plans, prototypes, 
etc. 
3. Most key internal solutions 
are kept in-house, key 
external solutions are 
incorporated; the rule of 
“competitive advantage” 
- Internally: lack of specialized 
knowledge of Open Source 
Software development; need to 
coordinate activities among 
departments and managers; 
traditionally proprietary mind-set 
background 
- Externally: securing submission 
primarily solving Nokia’s, but not 
wider OSS community’s problems; 
corporate plans vs. fragmented 
OSS process 
Intellectual 
Property 
Ownership 
Knowledge is quasi-public, 
different licensing types used 
Internally: unclear, introducing 
confusion 
Membership 
restriction 
and 
Incentives 
1. Membership is open 
(externals), although there 
is a core of selected 
employees and 
subcontractors;  
2. Salaries, fees, sponsoring, 
creating learning 
possibilities, creating, 
building career possibilities, 
and assessing candidates 
for job offers 
Willingness to work for Nokia, 
either formally or voluntary 
depends on the trust in their 
expertise, and trust in the 
company’s declaration to support 
open source project. 
Difficulty in recruiting permanent 
staff and relocate them to 
Finland. 
Loyalty problems. 
Authority 
and 
coordination 
Problematic (peer/company 
review and control), the 
‘connecting people approach’  
Encouraging self-organization 
within the limits) 
Clash of open source mentality 
with corporate strategy. Identity 
problems. 
Inconsistency in policies slows the 
development. 
Dominant 
mode of 
communicati
on 
Technology-mediated, face-
to-face interactions at 
meetings/conferences 
(usually more often than once 
a year, networking, PR) 
Open source developers striving 
to work in the open, while 
corporate policy is to retaining 
Intellectual Property.  
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